Chapter 4 Section 3- Art as agent

If space is constructed by the means of production of a given society,  then what means of production enters in that of a gallery or an artist's given practice? One means to answering this question is found in the thought of Alfred Gell, a British anthropologist. His provocative thesis considers art objects as actors in the same sense as Bruno Latour , John Law and others who advocate Actor-Network Theory. Gell's argument, briefly put, is that agency is a perceptual category in the audience, rather than an expression of intentionality from within the actor. Some authors have debated whether a distinction should be drawn between actors(human agents) and actants(non human agents). Regardless, and my position is that this is a ontic or mundane response to a ontological or theoretical argument that is based on distaste for being considered as unintentional by others. The argument that an object (human objects?) have agency helps us examine the notion of the boundary object and how scholars such as Star and Leissomer(CK) have conceptualised this idea. In turn this will help us to consider art works as boundary objects, and how they reflect the origins of the space in which they occur.

Alfred Gell, writing in his book, Art and Agency argues for agency being found in art objects. His consideration for why he argues for this stems from his desire to create an anthropological theory of art which can avoid referring to specific aesthetics as the basis for considering social relationships(p.3). Instead he introduces the idea that "persons or  'social agents' are, in certain contexts, substituted for by art objects."(p. 5) Gell embraces the theoretical position that the art object is defined within the milieu in which it was created(p. 7). In keeping with other anthropological theories, such as apply to kinship, economics and the like, Gell defines the anthropology of art' as the theoretical study of 'social relations in the vicinity of objects mediating social agency'(p.7) rather than looking for aesthetic principles, Gell looks for actions which which belie agency; He considers art objects as being a index of agency and contemporary western art practices as being a subset of the totality of those indexes(p. 15)

Gell defines an agent as"one who has the capacity to initiate causal events in his/her vicinity" (p.19)His definition of agency leads him to argue that we identify an agent when "they act like an agent"(p. 20). He allows for the commonsense objection that objects such as children's dolls, works of art and so on by distinguishing between primary agents as having intentionality, such as human beings and secondary agents, that we do not attribute with intentionality(p. 20). However while he caveats these secondary agents as being channels of agency, he attributes both agency and our attribution of intentionality to the observer, rather than the observed. He describes the actor as" the agent" and that, or who that receives the action as "the patient" but characterises this as a contextual and fleeting relationship that must be considered in the broad social context in which it occurs(p.22). Intentionality with it history of a philosophical appeal to metaphysics, and theories of mind is not required for Gell's examination of objects as agents. Indeed, his argument seems more geared to disarm criticisms that his anthropology of art removes the 'anthro' from his object of study; that he eliminates the human. His arguement does not draw an operational distinction between "primary"(human) and "secondary"(non-human) agents. However Gell's reflections do respect our lack of conclusive experience regarding intentionality beyond our own personal anecdotal experience, and the inconclusive ruminations of luminary thinkers such as Berkley, Hume, Descartes through Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty who sought to explore, identify and define the nature of intentionality.

"Too often sociology remains without an object Like many human sciences, it has constructed itself so as to resist attachment to objects, which it calls fetishes. It has taken the ancient admonition of the prophets against gods, merchandise, consumer goods and objets d'art to heart: "Idols have eyes and yet do not see, mouths and yet do not speak, ears and yet do not hear."(Latour p. 236)

Latour's argument stem from a desire to rupture the dichotomy of interactionist sociologists, who see society arising from interactions from individuals and structuralists who see individual interactions as indexes of underlying social structures(Latour p. 230) Latour gives the example of how all the elements of a post office, with it's counter's, screens and so forth allow the interaction of architects, ergonomic specialists and so forth who are present via the the design and construction of the post office with himself and the postal clerk(Latour p. 238) He goes as far as arguing that social structures permit society to exist, as they permit the agency of actors/actants to exhibit itself beyond the immediate place and time that an actor/actant inhabits.(Latour p. 239)
__________________
Gell, Alfred. Art and Agency:An Anthropological Theory. Oxford ; New York : Clarendon Press, 1998

Latour, Bruno. "On Interobjectivity" in Mind, Culture, and Activity, Volume3, No. 4, 1996

Morphy, H. "Art as a Mode of Action: Some Problems with Gell's Art and Agency" in Journal of Material Culture, Volume14, No.1, 2009

Sutherland & Acord "Thinking with art: from situated knowledge to experiential knowing" in Journal of Visual Art Practice Volume 6 Number 2 © 200