During this video report, Bilal remarks that the table lamp is the second favourite target after himself but “is in better shape than me”. Visible tattered by several paint ball rounds but still functioning, the lamp serves as a metaphor for Bilal’s physical and mental state. In the previous day’s video, he had already said he had not slept in two days. In his memoir he described the great difficulty he had in getting any rest, especially during the first several days of the performance(Bilal& Lyderson, 2008 p.TK).
As a performance, this piece had very specific issues. Being virtually mediated to most of its audience, technical issues informed the performance. Rather than constituting a failure, Bilal himself would later note that these low fidelity elements call into question whether or not the images appearing on the audiences screens are real(ibid p.TK).
This kludge forms a resistance to utopic and dystopic notions of process. A potentially graceless but functional answer to an operational challenge, the kludge marks the point where theory ruptures. The picture perfect images promised by technology fail as servers hiccup, causing web cams to freeze,
When Bilal’s technician says webcam visitors to the performance are “shooting blind” because the webcam cannot provide a real time image my immediate reaction was drawn to reflect on the mediated weapons systems like the predator UAV which is operated by, among other organisations, the United States Air Force. An drone aircraft, frequently mentioned in the the media due to its increasing use in modern conflict, it is deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, but its pilots are based in the continental USA and operate the vehicle via satellite communications. This sophisticated system is supposed to operate under all conditions using visual and infrared cameras, ground scanning radar and other sensor systems to guide it, as it reconnoiters and attacks targets using the missiles it carries or guides other weapons from allied aircraft or artillery. A 2002 executive summary, attributed to then Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Thomas P. Christie(note 1) describes how operational units utilised “work arounds” to overcome failures in design, including what his report describes as “human factor” design failures(note2).
notes:
note 1-Thomas P. Christie was sworn in as Director of Operational Test and Evaluation for the U.S. Department of Defense in 2001. http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=2984
downloaded 4 June 2010.
note 2- Executive Summary of Operational Test and Evaluation Report on the Predator Medium-Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, October 30, 2001 downloaded from Project On Government Oversite(POGO) http://www.pogo.org/investigations/national-security/predator.html#Related_Resources, 4 June, 2010
Bilal, Wafaa and Kari Lydersen. Shoot An Iraqi: Art, Life and Resistance Under the Gun. San Francisco. City Lights. 2008
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